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REHEARING ISSUE 
Whether this Court's decision in Bluemel v. State, 2006 UT APP 141, 
issued on April 14, 2006 is in accordance with established Utah case law 
precedent. Specifically, the issue the State seeks rehearing is: Whether the 
Court was correct in holding that a trial court's failure to strictly follow Rule 
11 in accepting a guilty plea is sufficient to grant relief under the Utah Post-
Convictions Remedies Act? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 20, 2001, Ms. Bluemel was charged with seven counts 
of rape, a first degree felony, and one count of supplying alcohol to a minor. 
R. 61-62. On December 5, 2001, Ms. Bluemel offered a guilty plea to three 
counts of rape and one count of supplying alcohol to a minor. The 
remaining counts were dismissed. R. 50. The trial court did not properly 
incorporate the plea statement into the record. Bluemel v. State, 2006 UT 
App 141, f 15. The trial court did not inform Ms. Bluemel of all of the Rule 
11(e) factors and rights, and only asked Ms. Bluemel if she had any 
questions about the statement. Bluemel v. State, 2006 UT App 141, [^ 15-16. 
The trial court failed to inform Ms. Bluemel of her right to the presumption 
of innocence, that the State carried the burden of proving her guilty beyond a 
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reasonable doubt, that her plea is an admission of all those elements, and that 
she had the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses. Bluemel, 
2006 UT App 141, [^ 16. Ms. Bluemel informed her attorney that she wished 
to file an appeal, in which her attorney informed her it was being handled. 
After an appeal was not filed, Ms. Bluemel sought present counsel. Counsel 
filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, which was denied by the trial 
court. Ms. Bluemel appealed to this Court and this Court found that the trial 
court erred by dismissing her petition. Bluemel, 2006 UT App 141, ^ 18. 
The State then filed this Petition for Rehearing. 
ARGUMENT 
The Appellee, the State of Utah, has filed a Petition for Rehearing in 
the above captioned matter on the grounds that this Court's holding in 
Bluemel was contrary to established Utah case law precedent. Blueme v. 
Statel, 2006 UT App 141. Ms. Bluemel's petition for post-conviction relief 
based on Rule 11 violations falls under the interest of justice exception, and 
therefore is proper under the statute. This Court's ruling in Bluemel is also 
in accordance with established case law in that a trial court's failure to 
strictly comply with Rule 11 is a constitutional violation subject to relief 
under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). Therefore, this Court should 
deny Appellee's Petition for Rehearing. 
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To obtain relief under the PCRA, a petitioner must seek relief "within 
one year after the cause of action has accrued." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35 a-
107(1) (2002). But if a court "finds that the interests of justice require, a 
court may excuse a petitioner's failure to file within the time limitations." Id. 
§ 78-35a-107(3). The PCRA contains an explicit bar to any petition that is 
not brought within one year of the cause of action accruing, but the 
limitations period is not absolute. It contains a safety valve providing the 
district court with discretion to excuse any untimely filing when the interests 
of justice so require. Ms. Bluemel filed a petition for post-conviction relief 
outside of the one year time limit, however, this Court found that the interest 
of justice exception to the one year time limit was met based on the trial 
court's failure to strictly comply with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
Ms. Bluemel's petition for post-conviction relief is proper under 
Section 78-35a-104 which states that: 
"1) Unless precluded by Section 78-35a-106 or 78-35a-107, a 
person who has been convicted and sentenced for a criminal 
offense may file an action in the district court of original 
jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the 
conviction or sentence upon the following grounds: 
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was 
imposed in violation of the United States Constitution or 
Utah Constitution; 
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is in 
violation of the United States Constitution or Utah 
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Constitution, or the conduct for which the petitioner was 
prosecuted is constitutionally protected; 
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner, or 
probation was revoked in an unlawful manner; ..." 
Section 78-35a-104. Under subsection (a), Ms. Bluemel's petition was 
proper because her entry of a guilty plea did not conform to Rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. This violation amounted to a 
constitutional violation of Ms. Bluemel's rights. The trial court did not 
properly incorporate the plea statement into the record, and during the plea 
colloquy, the trial court only asked Ms. Bluemel if she had any questions 
about the statement. Blueme v. Statel, 2006 UT App 141, f 151. The trial 
court never asked Ms. Bluemel if she actually read, understood, and 
acknowledged her plea statement, or made any other inquiry. Id. at ^ 15. 
The trial court also failed to inform Ms. Bluemel of all of the Rule 11(e) 
factors and rights. Id. at \ 16. Because of this severe deficiency, this Court 
found that Ms. Bluemel's constitutional rights had been violated. 
In support of its Petition for Rehearing, the State cites Salazar, which 
applies to writs for habeas corpus and not for petitions for post-conviction 
relief based on Rule 11 violations. Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988 (Utah 
1993). In Salazar, the court found that Salazar's attorneys had made his plea 
knowingly and voluntarily. Id. at 991. The court stated: "[bjecause we hold 
1
 Attached hereto as Addendum A 
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that a Rule 11 violation does not warrant habeas corpus relief absent the 
deprivation of a constitutional right, we affirm without treating the 
compliance issue." Id. at 991. This statement by the court was followed 
with a reference to footnote 6, where the court further stated: "We stress 
that we are not retreating from our holding in State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 
1309 (Utah 1987), restated in State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 
1992), that the trial court must strictly comply with Rule 11. If this were a 
direct appeal from denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, for example, 
failure to strictly comply with the Rule would be grounds for reversal." Id. 
at 991, FN 6. In Gibbons, the court stated: "Rule 11(e) squarely places on 
trial courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11(e) 
requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is entered." State v. 
Gibbons 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987). The basis for that duty is found 
in Boy kin v. Alabama where the United States Supreme Court stated: "What 
is at stake for an accused facing [punishment] demands the utmost solicitude 
of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to 
make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its 
consequence." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 
1712-13, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). Therefore, the State's reliance on Salazar 
is misplaced because the petition for post-conviction relief was based upon a 
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Rule 11 violation, not a writ for habeas corpus. If Ms. BluemePs petition 
was based upon a writ for habeas corpus, then Salazar would be controlling. 
However, this is not the case, therefore Gibbons is controlling and a 
violation of Rule 11 is a constitutional violation. (Although this Court has 
stated that mere procedural violations of Rule 11 do not rise to the level of a 
constitutional violation, the trial court's clear failure to inform Ms. Bluemel 
of her constitutional rights when accepting her guilty plea is well beyond a 
mere procedural error. Therefore the State's argument is unpersuasive.) 
Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure: 
"(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest 
or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the 
court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he 
or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and 
does not desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the 
presumption of innocence, the right against compulsory 
self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-
examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the 
right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and 
that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and 
elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, that 
upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of 
proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those 
elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual 
basis is sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime 
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was actually committed by the defendant or, if the 
defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit 
culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to 
establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum 
sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory 
nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for 
each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea 
discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement 
has been reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits 
for filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of 
appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant 
on the record or, if used, a written statement reciting these 
factors after the court has established that the defendant has 
read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the 
statement." 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (emphasis added). The trial 
court's failure to strictly comply with Rule 11 amounts to a constitutional 
violation under the Utah Constitution and the U.S. Constitution. The Utah 
Supreme Court requires trial courts to comply strictly with Rule 11 when 
accepting guilty pleas. State v. Lehi 73 P.3d 985, 989 (Utah.App., 2003); 
See also State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1992). In Mora, the 
court found that during the plea colloquy, the trial court failed to inform 
Mora that, if he chose to go to trial, the State carried the burden of proving 
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Mora 69 P.3d 838, 842-843 
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(Utah App. 2003). "The right to require the State to prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt is guaranteed by the due process clauses of the Utah and 
the United States Constitutions." Id. at 842-843; See State v. Lopes, 1999 
UT 24,^ [ 13, 980 P.2d 191 (holding that "as both a state and federal 
constitutional matter, we conclude that due process requires that the 
prosecution prove every element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable 
doubt" (citing Utah Const. Art. I, § 7; U.S. Const. Amends. V, XIV) (other 
citations omitted)). "If the defendant is not fully informed of his rights prior 
to pleading guilty, then the guilty plea cannot be voluntary." State v. Hittle, 
2002 UT App 134,1f 10, 47 P.3d 101 (applying plain error test to Rule 11 
violation), cert, granted, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002). "We cannot accept an 
involuntary guilty plea and still claim to have done justice." Id. Ms. 
Bluemel's guilty plea was accepted by the trial court without strict 
compliance with Rule 11, and under Utah case law, this amounts to a 
constitutional violation. 
By failing to follow Rule 11, the trial court violated Ms. Bluemel's 
constitutional rights. "Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a 
waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal 
trial. First, is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed 
by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the States by reason of the 
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•Fourteenth. MulU llngan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S I , < l ' o i . 
Secon o trial by jury. Duncan v Louisiana, V*\ 11 »N, 145, 88 
• * *0 L.Ed.2d 491. Third, is the right fo •(, unhuni one's accusers. 
• v«e/ K. Ferns^ 380 U.S. 400, 8* S,( "I I0i'>.\ I • i Ed.2d923." Boykinv. 
Alabama, 395 TT S 2 ><v _ . - i /uy, 171243, 21 L.Ed.2d 2 ,4 
(1969). Therefore, Ms. liliiiincl 's petition is proper under the l'l« 'A, 
As a final .iii»'mpi Un a rehearing, the State argues that "{B/itcfin'l 
contradicts I Jtah precedent because it implies ilicit in assess!tid whether a 
plcii is ki»<> wing and voluntary, a post-convict it »H mini i*, limited to a review 
ofthe plea colloquy and the plea afrub if Apellee's Brief, p. 5. To 
support this assertion, UK- MJ , :-~/r. Salazarv. Warden, 852 V Jd 
988 (Utah 199 J : - uiit addressed this issue in Lclri: 
"We acknowledge the case of Salazar v, '"Warden, 8D2 r.zd 988 
(Utah 1993), in which the Utah Supreme Court did not limit 
itself to the plea record described in the preceding text. It held: 
"[A] court... is not limited to the record ofthe plea hearing but 
may look at the surrounding facts and circumstances, including 
the information the petitioner received from his or her attorneys 
before entering the plea.,f Id. at 992. However, Salazar is 
inapplicable here because it was not a Rule ! 1 case. It was a 
habeas corpus case, involving the issue of whether the 
defendant had been deprived of a constitutional right, see id JII 
991, which is "more than a violation ofthe prophylactic 
provisions of Rule -./. at 092. Accord Haase v. United 
States, 800 F.2d 123,127 (7th Cir.1986); State ex rel Vernatter 
v. Warden, 207 WA a M , 528 S.E.2d 207, 215-16 (1999). The 
Court explicitly distinguished "collateral attack" cases like 
Salazar from cases involving "a direct appeal from denial of .J 
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motion to withdraw a guilty plea." 852 P.2d at 991 n. 6. Since it 
was looking for a violation of constitutional magnitude, the 
Salazar court did not restrict itself to reviewing only the plea 
record. Tellingly, the Utah Supreme Court has never applied 
Salazarfs expanded-record standard to a pure Rule 11 case. The 
Court's post-Salazar Rule 11 cases have restricted themselves 
to the more limited record we have described. See, e.g., State v. 
Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah 1996). Some of this court's 
Rule 11 cases may have slightly misconstrued Salazar, citing it 
for the proposition that it does apply to Rule 11 cases. See, e.g., 
State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28,% 17, 996 P.2d 1065, aff d on 
other grounds, 2001 UT 68, 31 P.3d 528; State v. Stilling, 856 
P.2d 666, 674-75 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (addressing Rule 11 in 
the context of an Alford plea)." 
State v. Lehi 73 P.3d 985, 989 FN 3 (Utah.App., 2003). Therefore, this 
Court's decision is not against established case law; it falls in line with an 
established precedent that in appeals based on Rule 11 violations, the record 
is limited. This Court has stated that in Salazar, the Utah Supreme Court 
looked to circumstantial evidence in order to determine whether a 
constitutional violation besides Rule 11 was committed. However, it is still 
well settled that a trial court must strictly comply with Rule 11 and that the 
record on appeal for a Rule 11 violation is limited. 
Since the State's reliance on Salazar is inapplicable because the 
present involves a direct appeal on a Rule 11 violation and not a habeas 
corpus writ, and because the Court's ruling in Bluemel is in accordance with 
established case law precedent, the Petition for Rehearing should be denied. 
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)iiU'<l this 'Z_ day of May, 2006. 
/ 
Grego) 
Attor 
Skordas 
r Tammy Bluemel 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ^ .^May of May, 2006,1 caused two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing to be deposited in the U.S. Mail, first class, pre-postage paid, 
addressed to: 
Brett J. Delporto 
Mark L. Shurleff 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
!/, /s<*.'?f &* s^&^t*'^* 
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ADDENDUM A 
This opinion is subject to revision bei 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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Before'Judges Bench, McHugh7 and Orme, 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
Hi Tammy Bluemel appeals the dismissal of her petition for 
post-conviction relief. The trial court concluded that the 
petition was untimely filed and did not constitute an interests-
of-justice exception under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act 
(PCRA). See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107 (Supp. 2005). We 
reverse and remand for further proceedings. 
BACKGROUND 
]\2 Between October 1998 and April lyyy, Bluemel allegedly 
engaged in sexual intercourse with her fourteen-year-old foster 
son on several occasions and, in one instance, gave him alcohol. 
Bluemel was charged with seven counts of rape, all first degree 
felonies, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 (2003), and one count of 
supplying alcohol to a minor, a class A misdemeanor, see Utah 
Code Ann. § 32A-12-203 (2003), 
f3 With the assistance of her trial counsel, Bluemel negotiated 
a plea agreement, which was reduced to writing as a plea 
statement. The plea statement indicated that Bluemel agreed to 
plead guilty to three counts of rape and one count of supplying 
alcohol to a minor, while the State agreed to dismiss the other 
four counts of rape. The plea statement referenced the 
consequences of entering a guilty plea and discussed basic 
constitutional rights, such as the right to a jury trial, the 
right to presumption of innocence, and the State's burden of 
proof. The plea statement also declared that Bluemel waived 
these constitutional rights and that she voluntarily entered her 
pleas. Further, the plea statement indicated that Bluemel read 
and understood the plea statement, that she was "not under the 
influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants," and that she 
"knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter[ed] " her pleas. 
f4 During her arraignment, the trial court1 informed Bluemel 
that "[b]efore I can accept your pleas, you have certain 
[c]onstitutional [r]ights that you need to waive. They are 
talked about in that statement in advance of plea. Do you have 
any questions about the statement?" Bluemel indicated that she 
did not have any questions about the plea statement. The trial 
court went on to ask Bluemel if she understood her constitutional 
rights and that she would be waiving them. Bluemel responded 
affirmatively. The trial court then informed Bluemel "that if 
you wish to withdraw these pleas you need to make a motion in 
writing to do that within [thirty] days of sentencing" and that 
the court "would not automatically grant that motion." Bluemel 
acknowledged that she understood. The trial court then stated, 
"[s]o if you do intend to plea, then let's have you sign the 
[plea] statement." Bluemel, her attorney, the prosecutor, and 
the trial judge all signed the plea statement. Bluemel then 
verbally entered on the record her guilty pleas to three counts 
of rape and one count of supplying alcohol to a minor. The trial 
court accepted the pleas and found that "Bluemel ha[d] knowingly 
and voluntarily entered her pleas." 
U5 On March 27, 2002, Bluemel was sentenced to three 
indeterminate terms of not less than five years to life and one 
indeterminate term not to exceed one year, all of which would run 
concurrently. Bluemel was immediately taken into custody and 
remains incarcerated. 
H6 Immediately following her sentencing, Bluemel allegedly 
informed her trial counsel that she wanted to appeal. Her trial 
1. Judge Guy R. Burningham, who has since retired, presided over 
Bluemel's arraignment in 2001. Later, in 2005, Judge James R. 
Taylor presided over and dismissed Bluemel's petition for post-
conviction relief. For ease of reference, we refer to both 
judges as "the trial court." 
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counsel, allegedly advised. Bluemel that he would, handle her appeal 
and informed her that she had one year to file her appeal. 
During her first year in prison, her trial counsel allegedly 
visited her three times and continually informed her that he was 
still working on her appeal. Bluemel later attempted to contact 
her trial counsel concerning the status of her appeal, but he 
refused to respond to her communications. After one year, 
Bluemel sought other legal counsel and hired her current counsel 
in October 2003. After meeting with Bluemel and reviewing the 
matter, her current counsel filed the petition on May 3, 2004, 
over two years after her sentencing date. The State moved for 
dismissal of the petition because it was untimely and did not 
qualify under the interests-of-justice exception. The trial 
court dismissed Bluemel's petition and now she appeals the 
dismissal. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1J7 Bluemel argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her 
petition for post-conviction relief as untimely because her 
circumstances come within the interests-of-justice exception 
under the PCRA. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107. Bluemel 
asserts that she did not enter knowing and voluntary pleas and 
received ineffective assistance of counsel, either of which 
warrants post-conviction relief. Dismissal of a petition for 
post-conviction relief is reviewed "'for correctness without 
deference to the [trial] court's conclusions of law,1" Gardner 
v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42,^7, 94 P.3d 263 (quoting Rudolph v. 
Galetka, 2-002 UT 7,*-: '2 P.:M -67). . 
ANALYSIS 
f8 "[T]he legislature enacted the PCRA to 'establish[] a 
substantive legal remedy for any person who challenges a 
conviction or sentence for a criminal offense.*" id. at: %9 
(second alteration in original) (quoting Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-35a-102(1) (2002)), Under the PCRA, a person may file a 
petition for post-conviction relief within one year after "the 
last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final 
judgment of conviction if no appeal is taken." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-35a-107(2)(a). However, an untimely filing may be excused 
" [i ] f the court finds that the interests of justice ^c 1 
require." IcL. § 78-35a-107(3). 
H9 Bluemel argues that her circumstances in this matter fit 
within the PCRA's interests-of-justice exception, and that her 
petition should not have been dismissed. Bluemel claims the 
exception should be recognized here because (1 ) she did not: enter 
">nnqo208-CA 3 
knowing and voluntary pleas and (2) she received ineffective 
assistance of counsel throughout the course of the trial court 
proceedings. In support of her claim that she did not enter 
knowing and voluntary pleas, Bluemel argues that the trial court 
failed to strictly comply with rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. See Utah R. Crim. P. II.2 
flO "The procedures for entering a guilty plea are set forth in 
rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure." State v. 
Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60,til, 983 P.2d 556; see also Utah R. Crim. 
P. 11. "The plea-taking proceedings [in rule 11] are intended to 
insure that a defendant who pleads guilty knowingly and 
voluntarily waives the protections the constitution guarantees 
him or her prior to a trial verdict." State v. Stilling, 856 
P.2d 666, 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). "A guilty plea must be 
knowingly and voluntarily made in order to protect a defendant's 
due process rights." Id. "It is well established under Utah law 
that we will presume harm . . . when a trial court fails to 
inform a defendant of his constitutional rights under rule 11." 
State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117,1(22, 69 P.3d 838 (omission in 
original) (citation and quotations omitted). "We presume harm 
because, by not knowing which rights a defendant is waiving, the 
defendant cannot make a fully informed decision." Id. (citation 
and quotations omitted). "If the defendant is not fully informed 
of his rights prior to pleading guilty, then the guilty plea 
cannot be voluntary. We cannot accept an involuntary guilty plea 
and still claim to have done justice." Id. (citation and 
quotations omitted). 
fll Under Utah law, the trial court bears the burden of ensuring 
strict compliance with rule 11. See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 
1309, 1312-13 (Utah 1987), appeal after remand on other grounds, 
779 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989). "This means 'that the trial court 
[must] personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea is 
truly knowing and voluntary and establish on the record that the 
defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional rights.1" 
State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88,1[llf 22 P.3d 1242 (alteration in 
original) (quoting State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 
1993)). Although the trial court has "a duty of 'strict1 
compliance" with rule 11, strict compliance "does not mandate a 
particular script or rote recitation of the rights listed." Id. 
In Visser, the Utah Supreme Court "reemphasize[d] that the 
2. Because our decision that the trial court did not strictly 
comply with rule 11 by failing to inform Bluemel of certain 
constitutional rights is dispositive, we need not address her 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel nor Bluemel's argument 
concerning the influence of prescription medications, which 
allegedly prevented her from sufficiently understanding her plea. 
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substantive goal of rule 11 is to ensure that defendants know of 
their rights and thereby understand the basic consequences of 
their decision to plead guilty. That goal should not be 
overshadowed or undermined by formalistic ritual." Id. 
fl2 Rule 11(e) identifies specific rights and factors of which 
the trial court must inform the defendant. See Utah R. Crim. P. 
11(e). These include, among other things, that the plea is 
voluntary, the right to presumption of innocence, the right to 
counsel, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the 
right to a speedy trial before a jury, the right to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses, and that the defendant waives these 
rights. See id. Rule 11(e) also requires that the "defendant 
understand [] the nature and elements of the offense to which the 
plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those elements." 
Id. 
Hl3 In determining whether a defendant is informed of his or her 
rights, properly understands them, and voluntarily waives them, 
the trial court must engage in a plea colloquy with the 
defendant. See id. Rule 11 provides two avenues whereby the 
trial court may properly engage in a plea colloquy. The trial 
court may (1) verbally question the defendant on the record 
regarding each of the factors and rights described in rule 11(e) 
or (2) receive a written plea statement from the defendant 
regarding each of the rights and factors. See id. The plea 
statement is "used to promote efficiency during a plea colloquy." 
Mora, 2003 UT App 117 at fl9. "However, [a plea statement] 
should be only the starting point, not an end point, in the 
pleading process." Id. (citation and quotations omitted). "It 
is critical . . . that strict [r]ule 11 compliance be 
demonstrated on the record at the time the guilty . . . plea is 
entered. Therefore, if [a plea statement] is used to aid [r]ule 
11 compliance, it must be addressed during the plea hearing." 
Id. (first omission, and first and third alterations in original) 
(citations and quotations omitted). 
1|14 "The trial court must conduct an inquiry to establish that 
the defendant understands the [plea statement] and voluntarily 
signed it." Id. (citation and quotations omitted); see also 
State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1991) (holding a plea 
statement is "properly incorporated in the record" when "the 
trial judge ascertains in the plea colloquy that the defendant 
has read, has understood, and acknowledges all the information 
contained therein"), appeal after remand, 924 P.2d 904 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 957 P.2d 598 (Utah 1998). At 
that time, "omissions or ambiguities in the [statement] must be 
clarified during the plea hearing, as must any uncertainties 
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raised in the course of the plea colloquy." State v. Smith, 812 
P.2d 470, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Thus, "the 
efficiency-promoting function of the [plea statement] is thereby 
served, in that the court need not repeat, verbatim, rule 11 
inquiries that are clearly posed and answered in the [statement], 
unless rule 11 by its terms specifically requires such 
repetition." Id. 
fl5 In this case, the plea statement was not properly 
incorporated into the record. During the plea colloquy 
concerning her statement, the trial court asked Bluemel only if 
she had "any questions about the statement." Bluemel responded 
that she did not and was directed by the trial court to sign the 
statement. However, the trial court never asked Bluemel if she 
actually read, understood, and acknowledged her plea statement. 
See Maguire, 83 0 P.2d at 217. Nor did the trial court make any 
other similar inquiry. We conclude that this was a critical 
error. As a result, "the [statement] was not properly 
incorporated into the record, and we may not consider it when 
determining whether the record establishes that the trial court 
strictly complied with rule 11." State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 
117,1(20, 69 P.3d 838. 
fl6 In reviewing the plea colloquy (exclusive of the plea 
statement) in this matter, the trial court failed to inform 
Bluemel of all of the rule 11(e) factors and rights. See Utah R. 
Crim. P. 11(e). Specifically, the trial court failed to inform 
Bluemel of her "right to the presumption of innocence," that the 
State carried the burden of proving her guilty "beyond a 
reasonable doubt," that her "plea is an admission of all those 
elements," and that she had the "right to compel the attendance 
of defense witnesses." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3), (4)(A). As a 
result, the trial court erred by not fully complying with rule 11 
in this matter. 
iflV Additionally, because noncompliance with rule 11 infringes 
on the constitutional rights of the accused, see State v. 
Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), we conclude 
that noncompliance with rule 11 readily falls within the 
interests-of-justice exception under the PCRA, see Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-35a-107(3). As a result, the trial court erred by 
dismissing Bluemel1s petition for post-conviction relief. 
CONCLUSION 
fl8 We conclude that the plea statement was not properly 
incorporated into the record and that the trial court did not 
sufficiently conduct a rule 11 colloquy with Bluemel. As a 
result, Bluemel's circumstances qualified under the interests-of-
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justice exception to the PCRA and the trial court erred by 
dismissing her petition. We therefore reverse and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Ru¥stllW~Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
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